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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES, 
and DANIEL WAYMAN, ! 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
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a Utah Corporation, and WILLIAM ' 
W. BOWERBANK, JONATHAN BOWERBANK] 
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SMITH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 860334 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should the court below have made any determination with 
regard to Willard and Keith Smiths' right to indemnity without 
the issue having been first presented to Western Auto Radiators' 
Board of Directors? 
If so, should the court below have awarded the Smiths' a 
reasonable accountant's fee for time spent in preparation for 
trial and trial as "expenses actually and reasonably incurred" 
under Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o) (1953)? 
If so, should the court below have awarded "reasonable 
attorney's fees" without limiting those fees to fees "actually 
1 
and reasonably incurred" [emphasis supplied] in defense or set-
tlement of the case? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgment rendered against defendant-
appellant Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. in favor of 
defendants-respondents Willard L. and Keith C. Smith which 
ordered Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. (herein referred to as 
"Western") to indemnify Willard and Keith Smith (herein referred 
to collectively as "Smiths") for their attorney's fees and 
expenses based upon the court's finding of reasonabLe value. 
Plaintiffs and defendants Bowerbank, having entered into a 
settlement agreement, are not parties to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
William W. Bowerbank was the sole owner of Western prior to 
December 1977. During the year 1977 Bowerbank determined to 
sell the company and investigated various offers to no avail. 
He then offered to sell the company to various key employees, 
some of whom accepted the offer and subsequently became plain-
tiffs in the court below. 
In December 1977 plaintiffs entered into an agreement to 
purchase Bowerbank's interest over a 15-year period. (R. 134-
135) During the next five years, Bowerbank's health deteri-
orated and his financial circumstances changed. Bowerbank 
unilaterally determined in 1981 that it was necessary to modify 
the 1977 agreement and on January 2, 1982, a modified agreement 
was presented to plaintiffs on a "take it or leave it" basis. 
2 
(T, 465) That* agreement included a provision that defendant-
respondent Willard L« Smith would be a director mi president 
tml defendant-respondent K*-M I h * Smith would he i director 
treasurer of Western. (R* 8) 
Subsequently, during 1982 and 1^ 8 3 various agreements and 
practices were developed h T »nn!'lr jnd ither directors which 
plaintiffs below felt were for the benefit of Bowerbank and to 
the detriment of Western, 
Accordingly, plaintiffs FI1P«1 II id i n iqjiQbt lefendant-
apppliint smiths, ef • ah Plaintiffs' action may be summarized 
as follows: 
1. First Cause of Action was t , t jorel . t at 11 m ji u»e 
aqteeinpfil i UP* rfe^n plaint iff, in 1 William Bowerbank. (R, 41-42) 
2. Second cause of Act ion was * shareholders1 derivative 
action for misappropriation of corporate funds. 
3. Fhird lausi < I Act-urn l"or i accounting on the common 
stock agreement (19 8 2 agreement). 
4 Fourth Cause of Action for an accounting and termina-
tion of the consultinq aqrcement. 
1
 Filth "du3i» uf Action for issuing watered stock in 
excess of $150,000. 
h. Later a Sixth Cause of Art ion lot itnti^  fud md 
received I ietendand linger bank and J Seventh Cause of Action 
for rescission or reformation of a real estate transaction 
between Western and defendant Bowerbank were added. 
The *iM tuo pi o« eedt-nl Unouqh <h »i nvipr i and was pre-tried 
and an jrder entered on December i> 198b by the Court, (F. 230-
3 
254) The plaintiffs abandoned all monetary claims against 
Smiths except as to unearned fees. (R. 237) That pretrial order 
clearly sets forth the position of Western with regard to claims 
against Smiths (R. 243-244) and in fact adopts the Smiths' posi-
tion. Following several days of trial and further memoranda 
concerning issues unrelated to Smiths, the plaintiffs, defen-
dants Bowerbank and Western entered into a stipulation which 
compromised all issues between the parties except the claims of 
Smiths against Western and plaintiffs for attorney's fees and 
expenses. (R. 410-413) Smiths declined to participate in the 
settlement. 
The compromise reached between plaintiffs. Western and the 
Bowerbank defendants may be summarized as follows: 
1. Termination of the consulting agreement on December 
31, 1986 (R. 392) thus satisfying plaintiffs' fourth claim. 
2. Termination of the preferred stock agreement on 
November 1, 1986 (R. 394) thus satisfying plaintiffs1 first, 
third and fifth claims, and termination by annuity of the common 
stock agreement. 
3. Refinancing of an agreement between Western and 
William W. Bowerbank concerning the purchase of real property 
with an adjustment in the purchase price to reflect true market 
value and balance due thus satisfying plaintiffs' sixth and 
seventh claims. 
4. Payment by Western of $20,000 cash to William W. 
Bowerbank and mutual dismissal of all other claims except those 
of Smiths. 
4 
The compromise as between plaintiffs and the Bowerbank 
defendants represented a stipulated settlement which compromised 
the claims of those parties. (R. 391-409) Defendants-
respondents neither participated in nor signed the stipulation. 
(R. 402) 
The claims of Smiths for attorneys' fees and expenses were 
based upon proffers made in affidavit form and are annexed to 
the affidavits of David Cook (R. 456-469), Keith C. Smith (R. 
470-480) and Willard L. Smith (R. 481-491). Those affidavits 
claim that Smiths are entitled to be compensated for their 
time at the reasonable rates charged by certified public accoun-
tants ($40.00 per hour and $60.00 per hour respectively) for all 
time spent but not otherwise invoiced to Western at the rates of 
$13.00 and $14.00 per hour respectively, which had been the 
agreed rate of compensation between Western and Smiths. (T. 641) 
During the proffer it was stipulated that defendant-
appellant had paid all invoices of Smiths in full on a monthly 
basis each and every month including the period of litigation. 
(T. 641) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The lower court should not have made any determination on 
the question of indemnity because it did not in any way find the 
Smiths liable for misconduct or negligence and, absent such a 
determination, the statutes are clear that the determination 
5 
whether to indemnify and the amount thereof should be made by 
the corporation not the court. 
II 
Time spent by a party to litigation is not an indemnifiable 
expense under the Utah Corporation code. The legislature did 
not intend it to be and the court should not expand the defini-
tion of expense to include compensation for the time a litigant 
spends defending his past actions. Moreover, even if time is 
considered to be an expense it should not be indemnified at a 
rate in excess of that established between these parties over a 
period of more than forty years. 
Ill 
The lower court awarded Smiths indemnity for the reasonable 
value of their attorney's fees based upon an erroneous reading 
of Utah Code Ann.y §16-10-4(o)(2) (1953). There was no 
evidence presented that the Smiths acted reasonably in incurring 
attorney's fees and even if they acted reasonably initially 
prior to trial, it was, or should have been, clear that the 
incurring of further fees was no longer reasonable after the 
pretrial conference. 
The Smiths knew from the outset that they had no responsi-
bility to remain as directors and upon their resignation they 
would be dismissed from the suit, yet they not only continued as 
directors, but they directed their attorney to restate the 
defenses and arguments of defendant Bowerbank. Those defenses 
6 
were the responsibility of Bowerbank, not Smiths, and they 
failed to act reasonably in incurring those attorney's fees, 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY RENDERING 
JUDGMENT FOR INDEMNITY PRIOR TO ITS SUBMISSION TO THE 
CORPORATION'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 
Utah Code Ann., §16-lQ-4(o)(3) (1953) provides that 
Smiths shall be indemnified if they are successful in their 
defense on the merits or otherwise. Since the case was set-
tled, there was not a determination on the merits. Further, 
the fact that Smiths failed to participate in the settlement 
would indicate they were not in any sense successful by way of 
settlement. 
An examination of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the 
remedies sought reveals that plaintiffs sought to accelerate the 
buy out of the corporation and the termination of various con-
tracts which would give plaintiffs control of the corporation. 
The record on appeal reflects that on April 8, 1986 plaintiffs 
and defendants, except Smiths, satisfied all requirements of the 
stipulation and the case was dismissed with prejudice. (R. 
512-514) Plaintiffs did in fact succeed in gaining that which 
they sought. The Smiths were not successful "otherwise". 
Thus, Smiths do not qualify for indemnity under Utah Code 
Ann., §16-10-4(o) (3) (1953) and can only rely on the provi-
sions of Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o) (2) (1953) as a basis for 
their claim for indemnification. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that 
a corporation has the power to indemnify a director for his 
7 
expenses and attorney's fees "actually and reasonably incurred." 
The statute does not provide for the court making the determi-
nation, but rather provides that the corporation shall have the 
power to do so. 
In the lower court, Smiths argued that the District Court 
should use its discretion to determine "such expenses which 
such court shall deem proper". (R. 439) [Emphasis supplied by 
Smiths]. Smiths1 argument is a misstatement of Utah Code 
Ann., §16-10-4(o)(2) (1953). The quoted language only applies 
to a circumstance where a director has been first adjudicated 
liable and the court thereafter determines he is none the less 
entitled to indemnification. 
Since the only statutory reference to court ordered indem-
nity is in the circumstance of a director who has been liable 
for misconduct, the provisions of subsection (4) [Utah Code 
Ann., §16-10-4(o)(4) (1953)] mandate that the matter of indem-
nity be submitted to the board of directors or the shareholders. 
Indemnity under Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o)(2) (1953) 
for expenses in a derivative action by shareholders should be 
governed by the same policy as the underlying cause of action 
which forms the basis for the indemnification. In other words, 
if the shareholder is required to submit his grievance to the 
board of directors prior to instituting a derivative action, 
then to be consistent with Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a director or officer ought to be similarly required 
to submit his claim for indemnity to the board of directors 
prior to seeking indemnity through the court. A shareholder's 
8 
derivative action is a "remedy born of stockholder 
helplessness", Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp,, v. Smith, 337 
U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed 1528 (1949) at 548. In this 
case the frustration which precipitated plaintiffs1 filing the 
case below was the refusal of Smiths to even address the 
concerns duly presented to the board of directors of Western on 
June 29, 1983 (Plaintiffs Ex. 1, Vol 2, pp. 539-542). 
Smiths should be required to present their claim for indem-
nity to the board of directors. 
The language of the statute is clearly mandatory and Smiths 
have given no reason why, nor is there any evidence to support a 
contention that submission of a request for indemnity to the 
board of directors of Western would be futile. 
Western was not opposed to indemnity (R. 505), for actual 
attorney's fees and expenses. In fact, the corporation did 
agree to indemnity in its resolution of September 19, 1984 and 
provided, pursuant to to statute [Utah Code Ann., §16-10-
4(o)(5) (1953)], for payment of those indemnifiable expenses as 
incurred. 
Smiths chose not to avail themselves of that indemnity, but 
rather to duplicate the expenses by having independent counsel 
from either the corporation or the Bowerbank defendants. The 
pretrial order clearly indicates that plaintiffs sought to have 
the court reform or rescind certain agreements between plain-
tiffs and defendant William Bowerbank, recover corporate moneys 
from defendant Jon Bowerbank and all other claims were aban-
doned. [Page 8 of the pretrial order (R. 237)]. 
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It is difficult to understand why Smiths spent what they 
claimed to be in excess of $40,000 in time and attorneys1 fees 
defending a suit in which they were never more than nominal par-
ties with no exposure to any monetary judgment. The only con-
ceivable explanation is that they wanted plaintiffs to lose so 
that they could remain in a position of control with regard to 
Western, thereby continuing their profitable relationship as the 
corporate accountants. 
Western does not believe that time spent in trial and depo-
sitions is a proper expense for indemnity. The statute does not 
define expense; however, the courts have uniformly excluded 
those items. 
ARGUMENT II 
TIME SPENT IN DEFENDING A SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVA-
TIVE SUIT IS NOT AN EXPENSE ACTUALLY AND REASONABLY 
INCURRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN., §16-10-4(o) (1953) 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SMITHS $13,080.20. 
The issue of whether Smiths are entitled to compensation 
for their "unbilled" time spent in connection with the principal 
litigation as an expense under Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o) 
(1953) is really two-fold: First, whether the unbilled time is 
an expense. Second, if so, whether they should be indemnified 
at a "reasonable rate" or at the established rate between the 
parties. 
The court below awarded Smiths judgment for unbilled time 
spent in connection with the underlying litigation in the total 
sum of $13,080.20. The court found that Smiths expended their 
10 
professional time and were entitled to indemnification for the 
reasonable value of the time so expended. (R. 526) 
The lower court did not specifically characterize Smiths1 
unbilled time spent as an expense, however, the necessary impli-
cation is that the court so found for only "expenses ... actual-
ly and reasonably incurred" [Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o)(2) 
(1953)] are indemnifiable by the corporation. 
The simple fact is that the unbilled time of defendants-
respondents is not an expense actually incurred. It has been 
held that "a thing for which there exists no obligation to pay, 
either express or implied, cannot in law be claimed to consti-
tute an • expense incurred'". U.S. v. St. Paul Mercury 
Indemnity Co., 238 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1956) at 598 [citations 
omitted]. Smiths had no obligation whatsoever to pay them-
selves, nor is there so much as a scintilla of evidence that 
they actually paid out anything for which they have not been 
previously repaid by Western. "Expenses are allowed as an indem-
nification for money laid out or expended ... No gain or profit 
upon expenses, except interest thereon, may be claimed by an 
fiduciary". Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. 
Parsons, 144 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1944) at 237. 
Since directors are fiduciaries in this State, the Smiths 
are in a fiduciary relationship to Western. [Nicholson v. 
Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (1982 Utah) at 730; Richardson v. Arizona 
Fuels Corporation, 614 P. 2d 636 (1980 Utah) at 639]. Thus, even 
if unbilled time were to be considered an expense, Smiths should 
not be allowed a profit or gain. 
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A review of the affidavit of defendant-respondent Keith C. 
Smith, Exhibit "1" (R. 472-475), indicates that the nature of 
the services rendered but unbilled "for the benefit of the other 
parties to this litigation" may be categorized as either trying 
to understand the nature of the proceedings; searching for 
records to support accountings previously prepared; attending 
trial, hearings and depositions; and, preparing accountings for 
the various attorneys for Bowerbank and plaintiffs. 
A review of the affidavit of defendant-respondent Willard 
L. Smith, Exhibit "1" (R. 484-491), similarly reflects the same 
types of time spent for which indemnity is sought. However, in 
the case of Willard L. Smith's employee time sheet (R. 489-491) 
it is absolutely clear that defendant-respondent Willard L. 
Smith had established an hourly rate of $13.00 to $15.00 per 
hour for work done for Western. 
To allow Smiths to have judgment for $40.00 to $60.00 per 
hour when their own records reflect $13.00 to $15.00 per hour as 
a reasonable rate would be to allow a fiduciary to profit or 
gain from an expense. 
It is submitted that the intent of the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann., §16-10-4(o) (1953) was to allow a corporation to 
indemnify its officers for their out-of-pocket expenses of lit-
igation not to compensate them for their time. It has been said 
that expense of litigation "in the common and well understood 
acceptance of the term fairly and reasonably contemplates the 
attorney's fees, stenographer's fees, and other expenditures 
necessary and directly required to present the defense, and does 
12 
not include the collateral and indirect results of doing so." 
Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Aetna Life Ins, Co,, 160 P 465 (Okla 
1916) at 467. 
Many courts have made the distinction between fees which 
represent compensation for services and expenses which represent 
money paid out [U.S. v. St. Paul/ supra.; Almarez v. 
Carpenter, 477 P.2d 792 (1970 Colo)]. 
The only fees mentioned in Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4 (o) 
(1953) are attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT III 
SMITHS' ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE NOT ACTUALLY AND 
REASONABLY INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $18,450.00 FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Board of Directors on September 19, 1984 passed a res-
olution which authorized Smiths among others to be indemnified 
for their actual and reasonable expenses of litigation (Ex. P-lf 
pp. 635-637). 
Thereafter, Western retained Bert L. Dart to represent 
Western; Bowerbanks executed their undertaking; and defendant-
respondents did not execute their undertaking. In spite of 
Smiths failure to execute their undertaking (Ex. P-lf p. 624), 
all invoices submitted by Smiths have been paid. 
The provision cited in support of Smiths' claim for indem-
nity provides that attorney's fees are included in indemnifi-
able "expenses actually and reasonably incurred". Thus, the 
term "expenses" includes attorney's fees; however, there must be 
evidence that they were "actually and reasonably incurred". As 
13 
was said in U.S. v. St, Pauly supra, "actuality" must be 
proven for the expense to be indemnifiable. 
In the case at handf no evidence whatever was submitted 
that Smiths had paid their attorney any money at all, nor was 
there any evidence of their agreement to pay $100.00 per hour 
for his services. Thus, the element of "actuality" is missing. 
In the court below, Smiths had the additional burden of 
proving that the attorney's fees were "reasonably incurred ... 
in connection with the defense or settlement" of plaintiffs' 
claims against defendants-respondents as officers and directors 
of Western. 
The lower court did adjust Smiths' claim for attorney's 
fees down from $24,600.00 to $18,450.00. The basis for this 
reduction is unstated in either the court's memorandum (R. 501) 
or the findings of fact entered by the court. (R. 523-527) 
Since the claim was for 246 hours at $100.00 per hour and 
$18,450.00 is evenly divisible by $75.00 yielding 246 hours, for 
the purpose of this argument it is assumed that Judge Conder's 
award was for the total hours claimed, but at a lower rate of 
compensation than requested by Smiths. 
A review of the affidavit of David S. Cook reflects that at 
the time he reviewed the plaintiffs' second amended complaint on 
November 22, 1985, he had only spent 64.75 hours on the case. 
(R. 463-467) Thereafter, he spent an additional seven hours 
through the final pretrial conference on December 2, 1985 (R. 
467-468). The final pretrial order indicates that defendants-
respondents were not the principals nor was any defense neces-
14 
sary beyond that provided by the Bowerbank defendants. The rem-
edies sought by plaintiffs were against defendants Bowerbank and 
a resolution of those issues would resolve the entire case. 
The Smiths persuaded the lower court that Utah Code Ann., 
§16-10-4(o)(2) (1953) provides that in a derivative action, a 
successful party is entitled to be indemnified for the reason-
able value of their attorney's fees. While defendant-appellant 
agrees that the attorney's fees should be reasonable, that is 
not what the statute mandates. 
What is required is that the act of incurring the attor-
ney's fees be reasonable. 
Smiths took the position in the court below that during the 
existence of the stock purchase agreements they acted 
independently of plaintiffs and defendants Bowerbank (T. 355-
361) and acted as intermediaries between those antagonistic par-
ties. They admitted acting as fiduciaries (T. 135-138) with 
duties to plaintiffs, defendants Bowerbank and Western. 
However, the Smiths abandoned their neutrality when they 
adopted defendant Bowerbank's position and attempted to defend 
it. For this they claim the right to indemnity. Western takes 
issue with whether those attorney's fees were "reasonably 
incurred." The action of Smiths in resisting plaintiffs' 
claims, a number of which were clearly correct and all of which 
were accounted for in the final settlement, is not proper for 
indemnity. In similar circumstances the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Kansas City has refused to award attorney's fees for 
directors who joined in resisting claims, "a substantial part of 
15 
which must be sustained ... and under the circumstances their 
costs and expenses should not be charged to the corporation." 
Johnson v.. Duensinq, 340 S.W. 2d. 758 (K.C. Ct. of App, Mo. 
1960) at 769; aff'd as to this issue at 351 S.W. 2d. 27 (1961 
Mo. ). 
Even if the lower court is affirmed in its finding that the 
Smiths1 "actually and reasonably incurred attorney's fees in the 
defense of this action" the amount of those fees should not be 
affirmed. 
The affidavit of David S. Cook (R. 456-469) does contain 
numerous references to work done on the "indemnification 
issues". It is clear that from the time of the final pretrial 
(R. 230) Smiths1 attorney's sole issue was no longer defense of 
a derivative action but rather his claim for damages in the 
guise of a claim for indemnity. At the time of final pretrial 
he had spent 71 3/4 hours, yet his affidavit in support of the 
indemnity claim makes a claim for an additional 174 1/4 hours, 
the majority of which were directed to indemnity issues. 
Utah Code Ann., §16-10-4(o) (1953) does not provide for 
indemnification of a director's attorney's fees for affirmative 
matters but only for defense and settlement. 
CONCLOSION 
The decision of the lower court should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the district court for entry of an order 
requiring the Smiths to submit the indemnification issue to the 
board of directors. 
16 
DATED this 5th day of November, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND DENNIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to: 
Micheal Heyrend 
WATKISS & CAMBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David S. Cook 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Bert L. Dart 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this 5th day of November, 1986. 
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ADDENDUM A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann., § 16-10-4(o) (1953) 
16-10-4(o) (1) A corporation shall have power to indemni-
fy any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made 
a party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or 
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investi-
gative (other than an action by or in the right of the corpora-
tion) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was 
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, offi-
cer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, 
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses 
(including attorney's fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid 
in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in 
connection with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in 
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or 
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with 
respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable 
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of 
any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, 
conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, 
shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did 
not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably 
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation, and with respect to any criminal action or 
proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was 
unlawful. 
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person 
who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any 
threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the 
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by 
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at 
the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee 
or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, 
trust or other enterprise against expenses (including attorney's 
fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with 
the defense or settlement of such action or suit if he acted in 
good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or 
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation and except 
that no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, 
issue or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged 
to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of 
his duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that 
the court in which such action or suit was brought shall 
determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of 
liability but in view of all circumstances of the case, such 
person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such 
expenses which such court shall deem proper. 
(3) To the extent that a director, officer, employee or 
agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or 
otherwise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred 
18 
to in (1) or (2) of this subsection, or in defense of any claim, 
issue or matter therein, he shall be indemnified against 
expenses (including attorney's fees) actually and reasonably 
incurred by him in connection therewith. 
(4) Any indemnification under (1) or (2) of this subsec-
tion (unless ordered by a court) shall be made by the corpora-
tion only as authorized in the specific case upon a determina-
tion that indemnification of the director, officer, employee or 
agent is proper in the circumstances because he has met the 
applicable standard of conduct set forth in (1) or (2) of this 
subsection. Such determination shall be made by the board of 
directors by a majority vote of a quorum of the directors, or by 
the shareholders. 
(5) Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal 
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in 
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or 
proceeding as authorized in the manner provided in (4) of this 
subsection upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the 
director, officer, employee or agent to repay such amount unless 
it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be 
indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section. 
(6) The indemnification provided by this subsection shall 
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those 
indemnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of 
shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to 
action in his official capacity and as to action in another 
capacity while holding such office and shall continue as to a 
person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or 
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and 
administrators of such a person. 
(7) A corporation shall have power to purchase and main-
tain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was 
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, 
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, 
joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability 
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity or 
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corpora-
tion would have the power to indemnify him against such liabil-
ity under the provisions of this subsection. 
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ADDENDUM B 
ROLE 23.1 
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders 
or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincor-
porated association, the corporation or association having 
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, 
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the 
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the trans-
action of which he complains or that his share or membership 
thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the 
action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court 
of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from 
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from 
the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to 
obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative 
action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff 
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not 
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, 
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court 
directs. 
20 
ADDBMDOM C 
21 
iNUTE BOOK FORM 101 
FILMED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
FILE NO. C V 4 . ^7_^ 
TITLE: w PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: 
O / ^ ' v - j e c*£>cdv- i t/\^ JLT A J ! 
v : 
^\l <c^T^r w, A tJT & <K A d i <*T d r JX >i() 
( • COUNSEL PRESENT) 
- s i ^ v v w s : H Vyvc U T M ^ ^ 
u 
V2>^ u i d CoO K 
6^^r - r T>** v-T 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
HON 
DATE; 
K^^^iur £: Q o *>-> ?l£-\ 
uUOGI 
BAILIFF 
T~U^ fi^Y-T ^ ^ * * \ A A -Y-q v i <Q <^ >T| <TU_p ?yvj^^L^{ , A ^ c\ ^ A 
^ vn »~TVy p s - t o l l d c p s ^ *T D LQ f I [ &v~A L. S i ^ t i ^ ^ L " W 
S U 
- ^ 
« s W ^ , - «~c\ / A K-tL\-rL c ^ W •'— -, 
7 V K »ov^ ^ *-?ifLS~,L? 
V 
-72,: <> c ^ j r ) T ~f, d <. /J-i*i l 
±-
4-
/ u ^ $• o
 t^n 
PA<3fc} S@8&_ 
DAVID S. COOK £071 ~> 
Attorney for Defendants sra.o. 
85 West'400 North 
Bountiful , Utah S <i') 1 0 
Te I ephon.-. 29 ; - "': ' 6 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lako County Utah 
MAY 8 1986 
Oaputy C!a:K 
.>;... r f. nfJRT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE OM)\ fV, STATE 0' UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLIV" .TONF^  
and DANIEL WEYMAN, 
vs. 
WESTERN Al,rO RADIATOR .',-,., 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and WILLIAM W. BOWERBANK, 
WILLARD L. SMITH, JONATHAN 
BOWERBANK, KIM BOWERBANK 
and KEITH C. SMITH, 
Defendants. 
0/. ^00 »L 
, . a'-j *f- ^L/7? 
JUDGMENT 
L V U " o . rQi 
I I I U H f I M4 r i l l i i n i n e O 
^ t h , l ? t h . .- * iJ . . i . i J 4.i : '• * l } P h 
January 9 t h 5 1 ^ 6 T1 * s 5 * t = tT• - * ! f--
W ">v > r ' , \ \ ; t , 
Rjui a *:* r a r n v t u j i J - e t i i e r i e n t i v i c h was or.i . *. 
i n t 3 the recor ! *:.. i t - i n c o r p . - r a ' t ?i *nr^ - ^ t j ^ l a * " d i * - i 
January ' - . . , - - . . « ims 
o - -.. \ u u - r g d . r . - t Western ^t>: : : j a t o r 
Co., Inc. and the Plaintiffs for costs and expenses of litigation 
including attorney's fees and costs of court and for reimbursement 
for professional services. 
Evidence concerning the professional time and services of 
Defendants Smith and the professional qualifications, time expended 
and services rendered on behalf of Defendants Smith by their 
counsel having been proffered to the court and the court having 
received affidavits and memorandums with respect to said issues 
and having read and considered the same and being fully advised 
on the premises and having heretofore made and entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and good cause appearing, 
JUDGMENT is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator Co., 
Inc. and in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith in the sum of $5514.60. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Keith C. Smith in the sum of $7565.60. 
3. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith in the 
sum of $18,450.00 attorney's fees together with court costs in 
the sum of $278.57. 
lis 9 MADE AND ENTERED thi day of W\ ^ - ig86( 
BY THE COURT: 
DEAN fc\ CONDfc'R, D i s t r i c t Jujfoe 
Sc*" - ' ' .^u-gvi
 0 . .. vM judgment hv mailing „opies 
thereor . Michael .^ Heyrend and Thomas * M^II * ':- - -
for Wnlli-im Bowerbam , r^l^t' ": . - . . , .e;
 v -alt 
L J V - '" • * * ,iaj ;
 s ^ lorn-'.' tu»' Aester:< A u t o 
li JL »- i!" -^n: r Ntuin St,, Salt .ake * : h v . " 1 
J a m e s M c l n t v r ^ ^r-ornev •••>: *!*i:niift . * 
Lake Cit V ^ ^ £fj,\^.^_ 1 9 * ' . 
-3-
FILMED 
DAVID S. COOK #071S 
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^/ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES 
and DANIEL WEYMAN, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO., 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and WILLIAM W. BOWERBANK, 
WILLARD L. SMITH, JONATHAN 
BOWERBANK, KIM BOWERBANK 
and KEITH C. SMITH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. C84-924 
(Judge Dean E. Conder) 
This matter was tried before the Court on December 10th, 11th 
and 13th, 1985 and again on January 8th and 9th, 1986. On January 
9th, 1986, the Plaintiffs and Defendants, Western Auto Radiator Co., 
Inc., William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan Bowerbank and Kim Bowerbank 
advised the court they had agreed to a settlement of the issues 
among those parties, the terms of which were stated for the record 
and the terms of which were incorporated in a stipulation between 
those parties dated January 31, 1986 on file herein. 
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Ke i th . . . ^ ! t jK j i r C 3 p a c ; t i e s a s i r e c r • r s *:f W e s t e r n Auto 
R a d i a l * 
'. «;;c& pendent certified 
I ,< . ,c . . c c j u n t a n ' s j a u i t u i o f f i c e - ; n \*" ' . %e : * 
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sales agreement 'im , ^mmo ; ^ tock ties agreement anu. 198Z 
building sales contract. 
4. The accounting and bookkeeping services performed for 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. by Willard and Keith Smith have 
included providing bookkeeping and accounting services in respect 
to the performance of said contracts. Willard Smith and Keith 
Smith have functioned as President and Secretary of Western Auto 
Radiator, Inc. for relatively small salaries of $2,000.00 and $500.00 
per year respectively, and $50.00 per meeting for attendance at 
meetings of its Board of Directors. 
5. A number of financial reports and analyses prepared by 
Defendants Smith were presented at trial, including analyses and 
reports prepared for trial. 
6. The time expended by each of the Defendants Smith in 
connection with this proceeding has been summarized and placed 
into evidence including time spent in exploring settlement possibil-
ities and the tax ramifications thereof and assembling evidence for 
the other parties to this proceeding. 
7. Smiths efforts have been of benefit to the other parties 
including Western Auto Radiator, Inc., and had their efforts not 
been expended in connection with this litigation, they could have 
billed their services to clients in the regular course of their CPA 
practice. 
8. Each of the Defendants Smith acted in good faith and in 
a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to 
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matter. The services rendered, the time necessarily expended in 
rendering said services, the qualifications and expertise of counsel 
appearing herein on behalf of Defendants Smith and evidence con-
cerning the reasonability of the attorney's fees sought has been 
presented and considered by the court. 
15. The court finds that Defendants Smith are fairly and 
reasonably entitled to indemnification for attorney's fees and that 
a reasonable attorney's fee for the services of the attorney appearing 
herein on their behalf is the sum of $18,450.00 and that the costs 
in addition thereto for which Defendants Smith are entitled to be 
indemnified are in the sum of $278.57. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Willard L. Smith is entitled to judgment 
against Western Auto Radiator, Inc. in the sum of $5514.60. 
2. Defendant Keith C. Smith is entitled to judgment 
against Western Auto Radiator, Inc. in the sum of $7565.60. 
3. Defendants Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith are 
entitled to judgment against the corporation in the sum of 
$18,450.00 attorneys fees and $278.57 for costs of court. 
MADE AND ENTERED this fl day of Vyn ^  .1986. 
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